





Pain serves as a signal to elicit care from others. In turn, displaying pain might be attractive because of the benefits it might bring.
Additionally, displaying pain is easy, because helpers distinguish poorly between genuine pain and faked pain. Hence, helpers face
the problem of distinguishing true sufferers from free riders, while sufferers face the problem of communicating need convin-
cingly. This article will propose solutions to these adaptive problems. Based on theoretical arguments and on empirical insights
from lie detection research, it will be argued that the credibility of pain signals cannot be found in features of the signal itself, but in
its context. Namely, pain is obviously credible when the context features unforgeable cues, such as an open wound or the
enlarged abdomen of a pregnant woman, but also external cues such as the ice water in cold pressor tasks. In absence of such
cues, pain can become credible through costly consequences, such as refraining from rewarding behaviors for a significant period.
However, these adaptive mechanisms for communicating need may not be shaped for modern circumstances such as experi-
mental settings and therapeutic encounters.
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The adaptive value of pain lies in the actions it motivates
(Goubert et al., 2005; Wall, 1999; Wiech & Tracey, 2013).
On the one hand, there are the actions of the sufferer, such as
escaping a painful situation and adopting a relieving posture.
On the other hand, there are the actions of observers, namely,
assistance, care, and treatment. Observers detect others’ needs
based on observable cues of pain, so-called pain behavior (also
referred to here as pain expression or pain display), such as
vocalization, verbal complaint, or posture. Consequently, sev-
eral theoretical approaches assume that pain behavior serves as
a signal with the function of motivating acknowledgment and
help from observers (Craig, 2009, 2015; Fabrega, 1997; Finlay
& Syal, 2014; T. Hadjistavropoulos & Craig, 2002; T. Hadjis-
tavropoulos et al., 2011; Schiefenho¨vel, 1995; Steinkopf, 2015;
Sullivan, Adams, & Sullivan, 2004; Sullivan et al., 2001; Vigil
& Strenth, 2014; Williams, 2002). For example, taking an evo-
lutionary perspective, Finlay and Syal (2014) address the ques-
tion of why childbirth in humans is so exceptionally painful.
They argue that, throughout the course of evolution, the more
intensely women expressed pain during childbirth, the better
they were able to attract birth assistants and, in this way, raise
the probability of their newborns’ and their own survival.
Based on this advantage, intense labor pain in humans was
favored by natural selection.
However, following the assumption that pain behavior can
trigger a response of substantial support from others, the status
of sufferer is assumed to be attractive to free riders, namely,
people who fake pain (Fabrega, 1997; Finlay & Syal, 2014;
Steinkopf, 2015; Williams, 2002). Therefore, observers should
be suspicious of cheating (Steinkopf, 2015; Williams, 2002),
and hence reluctant to help (De Ruddere, Goubert, Vervoort,
Kappesser, & Crombez, 2013; Kappesser, Williams, & Prka-
chin, 2006). However, this suspicion does not seem to lead to
accurate cheater detection, as laypeople and even medical
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professionals distinguish poorly between people in pain and
people faking pain (Bartlett, Littlewort, Frank, & Lee, 2014;
H. D. Hadjistavropoulos, Craig, Hadjistavropoulos, & Poole,
1996; Jung & Reidenberg, 2007; Littlewort, Bartlett, & Lee,
2009). The assumed suspicion toward sufferers and the limited
ability to discover faked pain may contribute to the fact that
laypeople as well as professionals discount the sufferers’ pain
when that pain has no apparent medical reason (Chibnall &
Tan, 1999; De Ruddere, Goubert, Vervoort, Prkachin, & Crom-
bez, 2012; Gillmore & Hill, 1981; Halfens, Evers, & Abu-Saad,
1990; Tait & Chibnall, 1994, 1997; Twigg & Byrne, 2015).
Furthermore, high suspicion and low accuracy may lead to the
common problem of misdiagnosing genuine pain for malinger-
ing (Robinson, 2011; Shapiro & Teasell, 1998).
The claim that pain behavior can trigger a response of sub-
stantial support from others is at odds with the empirical find-
ings that pain is easy to imitate and that, hence, observers
should be rather suspicious and reluctant to help. So, the ques-
tion arises of how this contradiction can be resolved, that is, of
how pain behaviors can be made credible and thus convincing
to potential helpers. This article suggests that pain behavior
itself is not a credible signal, but that it can become credible
within a legitimizing context.
Pain Behavior Itself Is Not a Credible Signal
One common solution to the problem of the credibility of a
signal is the handicap principle: A signal should be costly, ren-
dering faking expensive and, therefore, unlikely (Spence, 1973;
Veblen, 1899; Zahavi & Zahavi, 1996). Referring to this handi-
cap principle, Finlay and Syal (2014) argue that the subjective
distress of the sufferer is the cost that makes pain signals cred-
ible. This idea seems straightforward, as subjective distress is the
most fundamental defining aspect of pain, and, from the per-
spective of the sufferer, this aspect surely must feel most costly.
However, this assumption is problematic in two ways.
The proverbial headache that absolves one from sexual
expectations is a cliche´ based on reality, while many college
students prefer to fake abdominal pain rather than fail an
important exam. Faking pain is not a costly excuse, since mere
imitation does not bring the aversive feeling of real pain. In
other words, there is a cheap alternative to the allegedly costly
signal. Furthermore, even the subjective distress of real pain is
not costly in the sense of the handicap principle. From the
evolutionary perspective, the emotional state of an individual,
such as the subjective distress of pain, does not count as costs or
benefits. Natural selection does not maximize individual hap-
piness (Nesse, 1991), emotional states are only a means to
achieve what really counts, namely, survival and especially
procreation. Accordingly, costs (i.e., a ‘‘handicap’’) should,
in order to contribute to credibility, lower the chance of sur-
vival (Zahavi, 1975), for example, by wasting energy and
resources or by imposing risks. The peacock’s tail, for exam-
ple, qualifies as a costly signal for mate quality, not because it
may feel uncomfortable to carry it, but because it costs
resources and energy and raises the risk of predation.
Parallels Between Detecting Lies and Detecting
Faked Pain
Pain behavior is easy to fake, since the subjective distress of
pain cannot be directly seen and, thus, cannot be verified.
Similarly, discovering verbal deception is difficult, because the
true beliefs of the sender cannot be directly seen and, thus,
cannot be verified. There are further parallels between research
on verbal deception and lie detection, on the one hand, and
research on pain behavior and faking pain on the other hand:
the assumed selection pressures, the research paradigms, and
the findings.
First, throughout evolutionary history, reliable verbal com-
munication as well as reliable pain communication may have
been mutually beneficial for sender and receiver alike. How-
ever, in both domains, the sender may have an advantage from
manipulating the receiver, and the receiver, in turn, has an
advantage from discovering manipulation, what may have
resulted in an evolutionary arms race (Bond, Kahler, & Paoli-
celli, 1985; Bond & Robinson, 1988; Dawkins & Krebs, 1978;
Fabrega, 1997; Steinkopf, 2015).
Second, both lines of research were not inspired by prob-
lems of credibility in everyday life, but by problems of cred-
ibility that may arise in specific professional settings: medical
examinations on the one hand and police interrogations and
questioning of witnesses on the other hand. Hence, the research
paradigms are similar. Both lines of research investigate the
respective interview situation or try to model it experimentally
(e.g., Fenn, McGuire, Langben, & Blandon-Gitlin, 2015; Jung
& Reidenberg, 2007; ten Brinke, Stimson, & Carney, 2014).
However, in the currently most common experimental para-
digm of lie detection research (e.g., Klein & Epley, 2015;
Schindler & Reinhard, 2015; Sowden, Wright, Banissy, Cat-
mur, & Bird, 2015), participants are simply videotaped while
telling a truthful or an untruthful story and the videos are con-
sequently used as stimulus material for other participants that
should detect deception. A very similar approach is frequently
used in research on pain behavior and faking pain, featuring
videos of people in pain and people faking pain (e.g., Bartlett
et al., 2014; Hill & Craig, 2002, 2004). It is important to note,
that in both cases, the receivers have to rely on behavior and
expression to judge whether the sender is lying or telling the
truth, or faking pain, as the case may be.
Third, both lines of research yield similar results. It is hard
to find behavioral markers of verbal deception (DePaulo et al.,
2003), as it is difficult to find markers of honest and faked pain
(Bartlett et al., 2014). Accordingly, it is hard to distinguish
people in pain from people faking pain (Bartlett et al., 2014;
H. D. Hadjistavropoulos et al., 1996; Jung & Reidenberg,
2007), as it is hard to distinguish deception from honest com-
munication (Bond & DePaulo, 2006, 2008).
Due to these parallels, the insights from research on decep-
tion and lie detection may also be pertinent to pain communi-
cation. In particular, doubts about the ecological validity of the
results may be a valuable inspiration for pain research. Park,
Levine, McCornack, Morrison, and Ferrara (2002) criticized
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that the low lie detection rates found in experimental studies
are an artifact based on the exclusion of contextual information
forcing the participants to exclusively rely on nonverbal cues to
judge the veracity of a statement. In fact, in real life, lies are
usually discovered by information from the context, not by the
nonverbal behavior of the liar (Masip & Herrero, 2015; Park,
Levine, McCornack, Morrison, & Ferrara, 2002). Accordingly,
introducing a familiar situation and diagnostic contextual infor-
mation to the experimental paradigm can raise accuracy rates
substantially (Blair, Levine, & Shaw, 2010; Bond, Howard,
Hutchison, & Masip, 2013; Levine, 2015; Levine, Kim, &
Blair, 2010; Reinhard, Sporer, Scharmach, & Marksteiner,
2011).
Credibility Through Contextual Information
Applying these insights from lie detection research to the
domain of pain communication implies to change the focus
from the credibility of the pain expressions themselves to con-
textual information. Taking another look at the example of
labor pain, we see that the rather cheap (in evolutionary terms)
display of pain by a pregnant woman just before giving birth is
accompanied by an obvious contextual cue: the enlarged abdo-
men. The obvious distress of pain might effectively trigger
attention from others, but the presence of the enlarged abdomen
legitimates the distress to potential helpers and even places
pain into a meaningful context that indicates which kind of
help is adequate. Similarly, an open wound is a contextual cue
that lends credibility to the accompanying pain signals. Con-
textual cues form a meaningful context for pain, provide hints
at a causal explanation and, in this way, lend credibility to the
pain signal. Similarly, the common paradigms of experimental
pain research not only inflict pain on the participant but also
offer a meaningful context. The stimuli, such as keeping a hand
in ice cold water (e.g., Vigil, Strenth, et al., 2015), receiving
electric shocks (e.g., Colagiuri, Quinn, & Colloca, 2015), or
undergoing heat applications (e.g., Fehse, Maikowski, Sim-
mank, Gutyrchik, & Meissner, 2015), are generally acknowl-
edged as painful experiences and, in this way, offer
legitimation for the participant’s pain.
However, in many cases, the cause of pain is not directly
discernible as opposed to the pain from an open wound or from
ensuing childbirth. For example, in case of pain resulting from
infectious disease, pathogens cannot serve as obvious contex-
tual cues because they are not visible by usual means. So, how
does the expression of pain become credible when pain beha-
vior is not accompanied by visible cues such as in the case of
infectious disease? Usually, infection leads to an immune
response associated with symptoms, such as fever, and a set
of sickness behaviors, such as loss of sexual, culinary, and
social appetite (Dantzer & Kelley, 2007; Hart, 1988). Fever
can be considered an honest signal (Steinkopf, 2015), because
it imposes direct costs, such as energy expenditure and the risk
of damaging host tissue (LeGrand & Alcock, 2012). Sickness
behaviors are based on a motivational shift away from imme-
diately rewarding activities, such as sexuality, feeding, and
building friendships, which allows maximization of immune
activity (Aubert, 1999; Lopes, 2014). Refraining from these
fitness-enhancing activities imposes opportunity costs on the
sufferer which could contribute to the credibility of pain
expressions.
Other painful conditions which do not have a directly dis-
cernible cause, such as musculoskeletal or neuropathic pain,
can also change the behavior of the sufferer. Pain can be seen as
a motivational state that demands escape from the painful sit-
uation, seeking safety, and adopting a relieving posture (Wall,
1999). This motivational state, in this sense very similar to the
aforementioned sickness behaviors, undermines normal beha-
vior such as sexuality, feeding, and building friendships.
Again, refraining from these fitness-enhancing behaviors
imposes opportunity costs that could contribute to the credibil-
ity of pain expression. In contrast, a person who is allegedly in
pain but still enjoys life and does not miss out on joyful and
fitness-enhancing opportunities probably does not signal pain
convincingly. In fact, refraining from enjoyable activities due
to alleged pain leads to stronger ratings of pain by others (Kap-
pesser & Williams, 2008).
Behavior changes in the sufferer due to pain can impose
opportunity costs and, in this way, raise the credibility of
pain. But also the behavior of others may change due to the
pain of the sufferer and impose further opportunity costs
which in turn raise the credibility of pain. Displaying pain
might bring about support from others, but, at the same time,
be costly in terms of loss of attractiveness, for example, as a
mate (Ackerman & Kenrick, 2008; Vigil & Strenth, 2014). In
fact, people in pain are judged to be less warm, less likable,
less competent, less dependable, and less physically fit
(Ashton-James, Richardson, Williams, Bianchi-Berthouze,
& Dekker, 2014; Martel, Wideman, & Sullivan, 2012),
reflecting their current unattractiveness. In turn, the trade-
off between signaling a need for help and demonstrating
attractiveness to the opposite sex should also influence the
regulation of pain. Accordingly, when in mild pain, male
patients report lower pain intensity when examined by female
practitioners as compared to male practitioners (Vigil &
Alcock, 2014). Women in the high-fertility phase of the men-
strual cycle show higher pain tolerance in the cold pressor
task when experimenters were male as compared to female,
while this difference was not found for women in the low-
fertility phase (Vigil, DiDomenico, et al., 2015). These stud-
ies suggest that pain is reduced when the opportunity costs of
missing out on chances for mating is high. Conversely, incur-
ring these opportunity costs could make pain behavior a
costly and, therefore, credible signal.
Finally, it is important to note that opportunity costs can
only contribute to credibility significantly when they are suffi-
ciently high, that is, when the underlying behavior change lasts
long enough. Depressive symptoms exhibited for 10 min are
cheap, but if exhibited for 10 months they may be very costly.
Therefore, opportunity costs may be more convincing under
conditions of long-term contact, as seen within a closely
related social group, while they may be less convincing under
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the condition of short-term contact in a medical or scientific
setting.
Summary
Some expressions of pain are loud, attention grabbing, and
aversive for observers. These expressions may be optimized
for the purpose of catching other people’s attention, but at the
same time, they are rather easy to fake. This may raise the
question of how the pain signal is made credible. However,
pain does not usually occur in a vacuum but within a mean-
ingful context. Obvious cues, such as an open wound or the
enlarged abdomen of a pregnant woman, often accompany pain
and, in this way, make pain credible, even though the pain itself
is not costly. Even without obvious cues, pain may become
costly through its behavioral and social consequences. People
in pain refrain from rewarding behaviors and, in this way, incur
opportunity costs that contribute to the credibility of their pain.
In addition, pain signals vulnerability and, thus, a loss of attrac-
tiveness to others, which further contributes to opportunity
costs. Probably, the combination of attention-grabbing displays
of pain with a costly behavior change and obvious cues that
form a meaningful context constitutes the communication strat-
egy that most reliably elicits aid in cases of need.
Limitations
Throughout this article, pain behavior has been regarded as a
signal of need that may elicit care. However, displaying pain
can have very different effects, depending on the environment.
Not every observer will eagerly help a sufferer. In a more
hostile environment, the obvious weakness of the sufferer
might be taken advantage of by predators or exploited by con-
specifics. In such case, it is important not to signal need convin-
cingly, but to effectively suppress pain. Further, as mentioned
above, pain may be suppressed in front of less hostile others to
ensure mate value and social status. In fact, just like humans are
good at faking pain, they are also good at suppressing pain
expression (Hill & Craig, 2004; Larochette, Chambers, &
Craig, 2006). Further, pain behavior does not only communi-
cate a need for care but may serve as a warning to others. An
individual expressing a stomach ache may prevent others from
ingesting spoiled food, an individual displaying pain from a bee
sting may alert others to the presence of bees. When hypothe-
tically regarding the warning function of pain expression exclu-
sively, neither a sufferer has an immediate individual payoff
from signaling pain nor does a not-sufferer benefit from faking
pain, though exceptions are imaginable. This means that suf-
ferers should not invest heavily in signaling pain, but this also
means that observers should be more alert and less suspicious
toward these warning signals.
Throughout this article, pain behavior has not been parsed in
different types. However, pain behaviors are commonly cate-
gorized as either protective or communicative (T. Hadjistavro-
poulos & Craig, 2002). For instance, limping can be regarded
as protective, as it serves to favor an injured body part, whereas
facial expression is considered to be communicative, as it does
not serve a protective function and, at the same time, is easily
discernible for observers. Further, communicative pain beha-
vior is regarded as being more under conscious control than
protective pain behavior (Martel, Trost, & Sullivan, 2012) and
is more pronounced when the sufferer is intending to commu-
nicate pain (Sullivan et al., 2006). Both types can signal pain to
others, however, observer judgments of pain-related limitations
are rather influenced by protective pain behaviors (Martel,
Wideman, et al., 2012). From the perspective of the present
article, both types of pain behavior would be regarded as ful-
filling, among others, communicative functions. Communica-
tive pain behaviors, such as vocalizations, are useful to alert the
attention of observers, whereas protective pain behaviors, such
as limping, act as costly restrictions that make pain more cred-
ible the longer they are maintained. Thereby, it is important to
note that fake limping can be seen as equally costly as limping
forced by pain. However, limping forced by pain also serves
the function of protection, while it does not have this benefit to
those that only fake limping.
The present article treated contextual information that might
contribute to the credibility of pain expressions. However, cer-
tain contextual cues, such as gender, race, or age, can also bias
pain estimation (Wandner, Scipio, Hirsh, Torres, & Robinson,
2012). Being not only a lab phenomenon, the racial bias, for
instance, may cause racial discrimination in pain treatment
(Drwecki, Moore, Ward, & Prkachin, 2011; Green et al.,
2003). Not being the focus of the present article, such biases
will be subject to evolutionary analysis in a follow-up article.
Implications
The present article implies that research conceptualizing pain
as a signal or as an act of communication should not regard pain
in isolation but take into account its meaningful context and its
behavioral and social consequences. The context cannot be
ignored, as an exclusion of context amounts to the absence of
legitimizing cues. Furthermore, when a legitimizing context or
its absence influences the judgments and behavior of observers,
the sufferer probably adapt their pain communication to these
circumstances.
This simple idea may have implications worth considering
for current research paradigms. Research on pain takes place in
humans and nonhuman animals, especially rats, but nonhuman
animals do not receive extensive support from their conspeci-
fics when they are in pain. Hence, from the perspective of the
present article, the situational structure of pain communication
is completely different between the species. Rats were not
shaped by a selection pressure for credible pain signals that
might have shaped humans. Similarly, pain experiments in
humans may lack ecological validity when it comes to the
credibility problem of pain communication. The typical setting
constitutes a very comfortable situation for communicating
pain, because the pain stimuli provide immediate legitimation
for pain expression, and researchers even expect subjects to
express their pain. This experimental situation is structurally
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different from real-life situations when convincing pain com-
munication might be difficult, but most crucial. Making pain
credible can take time in real life. People with chronic pain are
in a completely different communicative situation when they
complain about their pain toward their peers or towards a phy-
sician. Peers can observe costly behavior changes over a long
period and can therefore acknowledge the credibility of pain,
while the doctor–patient interaction is too brief for sending
credible signals in the idiom of behavior change. In such a
situation, merely getting a diagnosis may alleviate suffering,
because the pain is recognized as legitimate and the effort for
making pain credible can be reduced (Steinkopf, 2015). All in
all, research on affect, behavior, and cognition of pain observ-
ers (Bastian, Jetten, Hornsey, & Leknes, 2014; Goubert et al.,
2005); research on the social modulation of pain (Decety &
Fotopoulou, 2015; Krahe´, Springer, Weinman, & Fotopoulou,
2013; Mogil, 2015); and research on pain malingering
(Butcher, Arbisi, Atlis, & Mcnulty, 2003; Kucyi, Scheinman,
& Defrin, 2015; Mendelson & Mendelson, 2004) could benefit
from taking into account contextual factors that can enable or
undermine pain’s communicative function.
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